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 Introduction 1
As SHM provides a way for collecting information to reduce uncertainties and to facilitate 
improved maintenance planning, it has received a lot of attention and is widely implemented 
in practice. The information collected comes at a cost, as a result of the installation of the 
SHM system, system maintenance, analysis of the data collected etc., which is not always 
justified by the received benefit. Therefore, the decisions whether to implement a SHM sys-
tem and which strategy to implement should be based on the evaluation of their benefit, which 
should be done prior to their installation. The benefit provided by a certain SHM strategy is 
quantified by the value of information it provides, in monetary form. This can be calculated in 
the framework of decision theory as introduced in [13] as the difference between the expected 
life-cycle cost (or expected benefits versus costs) of performing SHM or not, as also present-
ed in [1, 3, 6, 8, 9, 12].  
A Bayesian framework of joint modelling of the time-dependent structural performance and 
the hazard function has been theoretically introduced in [18] in order to do the maintenance 
planning and to quantify the value of SHM (VoSHM). In that framework, there are several 
factors, including the precision of the SHM system, the risk acceptance criterion etc., that 
affect the assessed value of a SHM strategy. In this work, these influencing factors are evalu-
ated, i.e. the risk acceptance criterion and the precision of the SHM strategy, as these influ-
ence the  decision making with respect to an optimal SHM strategy. This is a practical 
problem that needs to be settled for the decision makers. Take the risk acceptance criterion as 
an example, a lower risk acceptance level often means more frequent inspection/maintenance, 
which usually leads to a relatively lower expected failure cost but higher investment in the 
inspection/maintenance. A balance needs to be sought. In order to do this, an illustrative ex-
Abstract: In this contribution, an example is used to illustrate the application of 
Bayesian joint modelling in optimizing the SHM strategy and structural mainte-
nance planning. The model parameters were evaluated first, using the Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method. Then different parameters including ex-
pected SHM accuracy and risk acceptance criteria were investigated in order to 
give an insight on how the maintenance planning and life-cycle benefit are influ-
enced. The optimal SHM strategy was then identified as the one that maximizes 
the benefit.   
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ample is elaborated based on a reinforced concrete (RC) bridge girder subjected to corrosion. 
In the following sections, the joint modelling of the time-dependent measurements and hazard 
function is briefly introduced first and then the illustrative example is discussed. Finally the 
conclusions are given. 
 Joint Model and value of SHM2
2.1 Joint Modelling of Time-dependent Measurements and Hazard Function 
As introduced in [2], the hazard function, or hazard rate, is defined as the frequency of failure 
of a structure and is expressed in failures per unit time. In this regard, the probability of fail-
ure during a certain time interval can be calculated accordingly as the integral of the hazard 
function. As the failure rate is directly related to the structural performance, it is practical to 
model the hazard function based on the structural performance, i.e. the joint modelling of 
time-dependent measurements and the hazard function. Figure 1 shows an illustrative exam-
ple of the joint modeling, where  , 			are the threshold values, one of the risk acceptance
criterion, of the hazard function. The joint model is formulated as: 
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where equation 1 represents the process for modelling the structural performance indicators 
(PIs) varying with time, while equation 2 gives the survival model defining the hazard func-
tion. 	
 denotes the value of the time-dependent observation outcome at any particular time
point 	, 	
 is the underlying structural state which is a function of 	 and random effects and
ϵ	
 the error term that is assumed independent of the random effects. We assume that 	
∼
N(0, σ12) and CoV )ϵ	
, ϵ*	′,- = 0 for 	 . 	′, i.e. the error term is unbiased and the error val-
ues at different times are uncorrelated. The failure for an event is defined as the PI crossing a 
threshold value and is often expressed by a limit state function. As proposed in [18], a para-
metric proportional hazard model with Weibull baseline hazard is considered here, as in equa-
tion 2, where  is the shape parameter of the Weibull distribution and / is the failure time.
This formulation postulates that the risk for a failure event at time 	 is associated with param-
eters # and # which quantify the sensitivity to the value of		
	and its derivative over time
	$	
. This is logical for degrading structures: a structure with high performance level 	

and low degrading rate 	$	
 often has a low failure rate. #% is another regression coeffi-
cient. Under the assumption that the hazard of the failure event is mainly based on the value 
of 	
 and its decreasing rate 	$	
, #% can be predefined to a certain value.
As soon as the evaluated value of the parameters is available, the failure rate ht
 at a time
point and the failure probability during a period of time can be calculated as the integration of 
the hazard function and used for inspection time planning. The parameter estimation for the 
hazard function is based on the Bayesian theory and MCMC simulations. One can refer to [18] 
for detailed information and it will not be further discussed in this paper. The focus of this 
work is given to investigate how the risk acceptance criterion influences the decision or the 
optimal SHM strategy. 
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(a) (b) 
Figure 1. Joint modeling for (a) time-dependent structural performance and (b) hazard function 
2.2 Hazard function based maintenance planning 
2.2.1 Expected Total Life-Cycle Cost (TLCC) and Value of SHM 
An event tree model of a structure (e.g. a bridge girder) with or without monitoring is present-
ed in Figure 2. As illustrated previously in Figure 1, the implementation of SHM can provide 
more information of the structure which leads to a significant change of inspec-
tion/maintenance planning and as a result, the TLCC. Since the structural state and monitor-
ing results are both uncertain, the decision problem can be described in terms of the following 
notations and events in a pre-posterior framework for Bayesian decision theory as developed 
in [13]:    
- Θ: time-dependent structural state with prior PDF 2Θ$3
.
- Z: the inspection outcome which has an influence on the probability of detection and repair;  
- e: the inspection decision (i.e. inspection date, type of inspection, etc.). Inspection decision e 
varies according to the value of threshold 	
 that is applied;
- a: the maintenance action determined by the decision rule d and as a function of the inspec-
tion outcome z and inspection decision e, i.e. 4  5, 6
;
- X: the variable represents the monitoring result, which leads to an updating of the probability 
distribution of Θ to 2Θ′′3
. 7 denotes the case without taking SHM, and 7 the case
with a certain monitoring strategy implemented, as in the first node illustrated in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 Decision tree model for inspection/repair planning with and without monitoring 
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For a monitoring strategy, calculation of the expected TLCC is needed based on the branches 
after the first node. The probability of occurrence of the branches after the first node in the 
decision tree is calculated based on the probabilities of detection of a certain deterioration 
state 89:	and probabilities of taking repair action 8:;  given a detected deterioration state
with no repair before 	 as in equation 3, which is in accordance with [2, 7, 11].
89:  Φ <=

=>.@
>.@
A , 	8:;  < =


=BCD
A
C 	EF	G	
 ≤ GIJK (3) 
where Φ is the standard Gaussian cumulative distribution function; G	
 and GIJK  are the
damage intensity at time 	 and the maximum acceptable damage intensity, respectively. The
value of G	
 represents the deterioration level and GIJK=1. G.L and .L	are parameters de-
scribing the quality of the inspection procedure, representing the damage intensity corre-
sponding to a 50% probability of damage detection, and its standard deviation; FJ is a model
parameter reflecting the attitude of the decision maker towards repair: FJ < 1 represents a
proactive approach, FJ  1 a linear approach and FJ > 1	a delayed one.
The branch of a failure event in the event tree requires the calculation of a failure probability 
!P	
 during time 		given no repair before 	. It can be calculated by integrating the hazard
function.  
In detail, the expected TLCC for an inspection plan is calculated based on the occurrence of 
each branch in the decision tree as well as the cost of the basic events, i.e. the expected cost of 
failure, inspection, repair and monitoring if undertaken. The expected cost for each branch is 
calculated as the result of all the events that happened in the branch. The expected TLCC for 
this inspection plan then is a weighted sum of the costs for all branches based on the occur-
rence probability of each branch. Specifically, the expected TLCC of a structural component 
during its design service life 	QR consists of the cost of failure, inspection, repair and monitor-
ing (if undertaken): 
S)T, 5, 	QR
- 	 S)TP, 5, 	QR
-  S)TU, 5, 	QR
- 	 S)TV, 5, 	QR
- 	 	S)TW, 5, 	QR
- (4) 
where S)T, 5, 	QR
-  is the expected TLCC, and S)TP, 5, 	QR
- , S)TU, 5, 	QR
- ,
S)TV, 5, 	QR
-, S)TW, 5, 	QR
- are the expected cost of failure, inspection, repair and moni-
toring respectively, which can be calculated in accordance with [6, 15]. 
S)TP, 5, 	QR
-
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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 TWgk  TWgh 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, ∙ *1 − ∆!P, 5, 	[
,m
cd
\ ∙ TWni ∙

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]  (8) 
where 	eUe;	 is the time for the nth planned inspection, r is the discount rate.
	TP , 	TU , 	TV , 	TW  TWgk , TWgh , TWni
 are the expected cost of failure, inspection, repair and
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monitoring, and	TW  consists of system investment TWgk , installation	TWghand operation per
year	TWnirespectively [6]. For more details, see [15, 17]. Then the VoSHM for the considered
SHM strategy is then calculated as the difference between the expected TLCCs with and 
without this SHM strategy. 
It should be mentioned that with a different value of 	
	, the planning of inspection times
changes, leading to a change of the expected TLCC. Similarly, given a certain 	
	 , the
expected TLCC is different for 70	  and 71	 , since the planned inspection times are likely to be
different in case the monitoring outcome leads to a different joint model. This will be 
discussed in the following example.  
2.2.2 Risk acceptance criterion and decision rule 
The risk acceptance criterion used in this contribution is denoted by 	
	, the threshold value
of the hazard function. This is the maximum value given by max	 , the maximum acceptable
annual failure rate. The latter is related to the failure consequences of a structure and can be 
obtained from the JCSS Probabilistic Model Code [5], where the target reliability index as a 
function of the consequence of failure and the risk reduction cost is defined. For existing 
structures of which the relative cost for increasing the safety is generally large, the acceptance 
criterion can be lowered as also suggested in [5], i.e. ∆!oIJK  10q
	yrfor large conse-
quences, 	∆!oIJK  5 u 10q
	yr  for moderate consequences and ∆!oIJK  10%
	yr	 for
minor consequences, where ∆!oIJK is the maximum acceptable annual probability of failure
[15]. It is up to the decision makers to decide the use of other values than the latter ones de-
pending on each case. According to the definition of the hazard function in section 2.1, the 
value of hazard 	
 is the failure rate or the probability of failure per unit time, where in this
work the unit time is defined as 1 year. Thus, the value of max	  and 	
	 can be specified in
accordance with ∆!oIJK.
As the probabilities of detecting a deterioration state and the corresponding repair are both 
function of the structural state which is a time-dependent variable described by 8/	
, the
planning of inspection times will have a large influence on the probability of occurrences of 
each branch in the decision tree. The threshold approach introduced in [16] is thereby imple-
mented in such a way that inspection is carried out in the year before the threshold of failure 
rate 	
		is crossed. The value 	
	  is a decision parameter set by the decision maker and it
must remain lower than IJK . For decisions on repair, the specification of the parameters
used in equation 9 is required: 
	
 ≤ 	
		 				for	inspection	
GIJK  G, FJ  F											for	repair				 9
	
where G and F are values assigned by the decision makers based on each case. G is the val-
ue of the maximum defect sizes that is allowed for a specific spot and F is the value repre-
senting the repair approach, see equation 3.  
 The Influence of Risk Acceptance Criterion on the VoSHM3
In the following example, the influence of 	
 on the value of SHM is illustrated for a rein-
forced concrete (RC) bridge girder subjected to corrosion. The degradation of reinforcement 
in concrete structures is usually mainly due to corrosion of steel, caused by chloride penetra-
tion into concrete, concrete carbonation, alkali aggregate reactions, sulfate attack, or freeze-
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thaw damage. Assuming that corrosion is mainly due to chloride penetration, the degradation 
process can be split up into corrosion initiation and corrosion propagation [4]. Here focus is 
given to the latter one. After the initiation of corrosion, localized pitting corrosion is consid-
ered as the predominant because it can be the cause of a high local reduction of cross-
sectional area leading to a large reduction of flexural strength [11]. Therefore, the maximum 
pit depth 8/	
 is chosen as the time-dependent performance indicator 8	
 of the beam in
the following calculation. The time-dependent performance model is formulated based on [11, 
14] as:
8/∆	
  F ∙ ∆	  	
										∆	 > 0	 (10) 
where ∆	 is the time interval since the corrosion initiation time, F  (mm/year) is the average
instantaneous corrosion rate and  is the ratio of the maximum pit depth over the average one
along a given length of a reinforcement bar.  follows a Gumbel distribution with location
parameter  and scale parameter  [14]. The expected value S
 is considered for this anal-
ysis (considered to be deterministic with a value of 5.67 in this case for simplicity). The prob-
abilistic model of each parameter is listed in Table 1. In this case, the time-dependent PI, i.e. 
the pit depth, can be expressed as:  
		
  8/	
  F ∙ 	  	
 (11) 
where r, in [mm/year], follows a lognormal distribution with mean 0.06 and CoV of 0.02.
3.1 Parameter estimation for the hazard function 
In order to simulate the hazard function, the following limit state function is considered: 
	
  	8/IJK − 8/	
, where 8/IJK= 4.43 mm [10], and the structure is considered in
“failure state” whenever 	
 < 0; For the example under consideration, the time-dependent
structural performance parameters are available and the joint modeling can therefore be car-
ried out by generating data sets from the known structural performance parameters, leading to 
an estimation of the parameters of the hazard function, assuming the hazard function is de-
scribed by the following function: 
	
  		  ! ∙	 F
 	 (12)
Based on the parameters listed in Table 1, 460 sample values of F and 	
 are drawn and
accordingly the values of 8/	
 are calculated. The time-to-failure data is then obtained as
well according to the limit state function. On the basis of this information, the estimation of 
the parameters of the hazard function is performed using the software WinBUGS and 100000 
sampling iterations are used, from which the first 1000 are disregarded as a burn-in phase. 
The results are shown in Table 1 and Figures 3-4. As a result, the hazard function can be ex-
pressed as follows on the basis of the mean estimates for σ and .
	
  4.054	%.Lq  !"−10.14	F ∙ &		 (13)
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Table 1  Estimation of  and 
Parameter Mean Standard 
deviation 
Fractiles 
2.5% 97.5% 
σ 4.054 0.1398 3.792 4.341 
 -10.14 1.067 -12.3 -8.11 
As mentioned in section 2.2.1, as this hazard function ht
 is available (see equation 13), the
failure probability during a period of time can be calculated as the integration of the hazard 
function which can be used for inspection time planning as well as calculating the expected 
TLCC, which in this case is the one without implementing a SHM strategy.   
3.2 Influence of 
on the VoSHM
As the actual monitoring data for different SHM strategies are actually not available in the 
pre-posterior analysis, the information that may be collected through the SHM is simulated as 
a decrease of uncertainty in F. In this case, the standard deviation of F is reduced by
multiplying 7: which is a lognormally distributed model parameter and represents the extent
to which the monitoring strategy would reduce the uncertainty. The statistical distributions of 
7: for different SHM strategies are listed in Table 2, in which 6 SHM strategies are consid-
ered with increasing accuracy from S1 to S6 represented by a decreasing mean value of 7:,
considering that a low expected value of 7: results in a large reduction of the standard devia-
tion of F. Realizations of the outcome of structural health monitoring are now generated
by random sampling from the random variable 7: and then inserted into equation 11. This
step is repeated in a loop in which new sets of PI and time-to-failure data are generated facili-
tating the parameter estimations (as in section 3.1) of the hazard functions for S1 to S6, re-
spectively. The parameters for the equivalent Weibull distributions and the relative value of 
the SHM investments are listed in Table 2 as well. For illustration, the parameters G.L  0.04,
.L  0.1G.L are considered for the inspection, and GIJK  1, FJ  2	for the repair.
Table 2 Model parameters for 6 SHM strategies and relative costs 
SHM 
Strategy 
Me
(lognormal) 
Equivalent Weibull 
distribution 
TP TUe; TV TWgk  TWgh  TWni
Mean CoV σ  [-] [-] [-] (10-2) (10-2) (10-3) 
S1 0.99 0.1 4.110 17.615 1 0.02 0.10 2.66 2.00 1 
S2 0.97 0.1 4.116 18.752 1 0.02 0.10 4.66 4.00 1.5 
S3 0.95 0.1 4.156 20.352 1 0.02 0.10 6.66 5.60 2 
S4 0.93 0.1 4.162 21.983 1 0.02 0.10 8.66 7.00 2.5 
S5 0.91 0.1 4.163 23.123 1 0.02 0.10 10 8.00 10 
S6 0.89 0.1 4.165 23.605 1 0.02 0.10 10 15 15 
Since the value of 	
	has a large influence on the planning of inspection times, the ex-
pected TLCC are expected to change with different 	
	values. Figure 5 shows the influ-
ence of 	
, changing from 10%	to 10, on the VoSHM. As can be seen in Figure 5, the
values for these SHM strategies are positive and generally increase with the 	
 , from
which it can be inferred that for the 	
 value in this range the information provided by S1-
S6 in monetary term overweighs their costs. Hence, the asset manager is encouraged to im-
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plement SHM in this case. Moreover, the increase of VoSHM with 	
 is mainly because
the information provided by SHM are more valuable for cases with larger 	
 values, since
the probability of failure, and failure cost accordingly, would be high in such case if there was 
no SHM implemented. It also indicates that there is a potential to further increasing 	
,
which however requires additional calculations.  
Figure 5. Influence of 	
on theVoSHM
It can be further noticed in Figure 5 that the VoSHM is higher than 0.2, which is significant, 
for most of the considered SHM strategies in case the threshold probabilities are larger than 
10. The high relative values are mainly caused by the reduction of the probability of failure
due to SHM which is significant for 	
	above 10. However, for threshold probabilities
	
 smaller than 10	the differences among SHM strategies are less significant since the
cost of inspection contributes most, since the inspections would be planned frequently for 
small		
	values, as also can be seen from Figure 1 (b), regardless of the SHM strategies
used.  
It can be also noticed that for 	
  10% the VoSHM of S6 is slightly smaller than that of
S1 to S5. This is mainly due to the fact that the information provided by a higher accuracy 
SHM strategy, i.e. S6, is for that case not so cost effective compared to the other ones. The 
same situation holds for 	
  10 , where the maximum VoSHM is provided by S4
which is 0.239 in this case. For S1 to S4, the increase of SHM accuracy provides more value 
than that of implementing SHM, while the costs for increasing accuracy of S4 to S6 over-
weigh the value of information that they provided, which leads to a decrease of the VoSHM 
for S4 to S6. These cost-related observations should be taken into account by the decision 
maker prior to the implementation of SHM in order to maximize the VoSHM.  
 Conclusions 4
Based on a framework for joint modelling of the structural performance function and hazard 
function, the planning of structural inspection/maintenance and evaluating of VoSHM are 
introduced. In this framework, the evaluation of the VoSHM are related to several parameters, 
among which the influence of the risk acceptance criterion, i.e. the 	
, is investigated with
an example in this work. The results show that the VoSHM as well as the optimal SHM strat-
egy varies with the change of 	
 , since it has a major influence on the inspec-
tion/maintenance time planning. Moreover, the VoSHM of different SHM strategies also 
varies for a specific value of 	
, as the information provided by SHM strategies with dif-
ferent precision are closely related to the costs of their implementation. Therefore, a case spe-
cific balance needs to be sought by the asset manager prior to the implementation of SHM and 
the process of optimizing the SHM strategies and maintenance planning based on the Bayesi-
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an joint model can be done by choosing the one that would maximize the VoSHM for that 
case.  
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